Finance America, disappeared after visiting Warren Summerlin's home to discuss a delinquent account. 7 Over the next two days, the police received an anonymous phone tip stating that Summerlin had murdered Bailey, 8 and then found Bailey's beaten and partially nude body in the trunk of her car, near Summerlin's home. 9 The police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the Summerlin residence, finding several pieces of incriminating evidence and later overhearing incriminating statements that Summerlin made to his wife at the police station.
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Summerlin was subsequently charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault. ' During court proceedings, Summerlin's public defender had a onenight "personal involvement ... of a romantic nature" with the prosecutor for the case, 12 and the Maricopa County Attorney and the Public Defender's Office consequently removed themselves from the case.
3
Summerlin was then convicted by a jury at trial 14 and sentenced to death by Judge Phillip Marquardt based on two aggravating circumstances and the lack of any "sufficiently substantial" mitigating circumstances. 15 Unbeknownst to any of the parties, Judge Marquardt was a heavy user of marijuana at the time. 16 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Summerlin's conviction, 7 and the federal district court in Arizona twice denied Summerlin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 8 Summerlin appealed the habeas denials to the Ninth Circuit, and a divided three-judge panel remanded to the district court to determine whether, in light of his drug use, Judge Marquardt was competent when he sentenced Summerlin which states that juries, like judges, may have access to inadmissible evidence, such as victim impact statements, during penalty deliberations). 46 As the dissent noted, Ring appeared to be a direct application of Apprendi to Arizona's death penalty statute, and the Ninth Circuit had already ruled that Apprendi was a procedural rule, not a substantive one. See id. at 1126-27 (citing United States v. 282 conclusive studies about the accuracy of jury factfinding in sentencing proceedings. 47 Instead of relying on whether judge or jury factfinding is more accurate from a results-oriented perspective, the court should have primarily focused on how juries more accurately reflect the moral voice of the community in capital sentencing proceedings. This type of "procedural accuracy" enables Ring to apply retroactively by placing it within the second exception to Teague and honors the Supreme Court's continued insistence that a capital sentence should reflect the collective moral judgment of the community.
The Summerlin majority and dissent debate whether juries or judges are more "accurate" factfinders from a results-oriented perspective. Therefore, for the Summerlin court, the relevant inquiry is which factfinder is more likely to find the truth regarding the guilt of a capital defendant. However, this discussion misconstrues the meaning of "accuracy" as applied in Ring. First, both judges and juries suffer from certain biases that can distort the adjudication process, and it is unclear which type of factfinder more accurately punishes capital defendants in accordance with an objective notion of guilt.
48
More important, the Ring Court indicated that the purpose of the new rule was not to increase this type of accuracy in the sentencing process. The Court noted:
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a death sentence might be "an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice ... [but] [t]he founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave [ criminal justice] to the State ....
[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been free." 49 F. 3 d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002) ). Furthermore, the majority provided no explanation for why Arizona's previous statutory scheme -with separate substantive offenses for capital and ordinary murder -was relevant to whether the Ring rule was substantive. See id. at I 126. 47 See supra note 35. 48 Compare supra note 35, with sources cited supra note 45 (describing the biases and limitations of juries), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-58 (2ooo) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing how judges are more accurate factfinders than juries in the sentencing context). The Summerlin majority's contention that juries are more accurate factfinders than judges from a results-oriented perspective is also in tension with the Ninth Circuit's decision in SanchezCervantes, which held that Apprendi established a procedural rule that does not fall within the second exception to the Teague bar. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 668-69 ("We do not believe that requiring the jury to make drug quantity determinations beyond a reasonable doubt will greatly affect the accuracy of convictions."). Notwithstanding this tension, one possible response to the dissent's contention that judge factfinding is less biased than jury factfinding is that a defendant who prefers a judge-made sentence can often simply decline to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Most capital defendants do not make such an election, perhaps indicating that jury factfinding is more beneficial to defendants.
[T]he belief that juries more accurately reflect the conscience of the community than can a single judge is the central reason that the jury right has been recognized at the guilt stage in our jurisprudence. This same belief firmly supports the use of juries in capital sentencing, in order to address the Eighth Amendment's concern that capital punishment be administered consistently with community values.
6
It may strike one as fundamentally unfair that a defendant can be sentenced to death in violation of his constitutional rights without the Constitution mandating the nullification of the sentence. This impulse forms a powerful undercurrent in the Summerlin opinion, particularly in Judge Reinhardt's concurrence. Rather than focusing on whether jury-or judge-based sentencing is more "accurate" from a resultsoriented perspective, the court should have acknowledged this undercurrent by asserting only that jury factfinding more accurately reflects community morals -a consideration that is especially important in the death penalty context. 5 7 Such a conception of "procedural accuracy" would honor the Supreme Court's earlier jurisprudence emphasizing the importance of community judgment in capital cases. If courts truly believe that "death is different" from other forms of punishment, they should recognize that the retroactive application of Ring ensures that the collective voice of the community bears on the ultimate government sanction: the imposition of death. 
